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I. Introduction  
 
Earlier this year, Rep. Markwayne Mullin (R) of Oklahoma’s 2nd congressional district 
introduced H.R. 44, dubbed the Muhammad Ali Expansion Act (the “Expansion Act”).1  H.R. 44 
would expand the Muhammad Ali Reform Act, so that Mixed Martial Artists and other combat sports 
athletes would be included under its protections.2  Introduced in 1999, the Muhammad Ali Reform 
Act was implemented as an amendment to the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, in order to 
expand protections to professional boxers.3  The Muhammad Ali Expansion Act was introduced on 
January 3, 2017 and has slowly been working its way through congress.4  The Expansion Act was 
initially referred to the Committee on Education and Workforce, and then later referred to the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee.5  Most recently, the Expansion Act was reviewed by the 
Subcommittee on Digital Commerce and Consumer Protections on November 9, 2017, in a hearing 
entitled, “Perspectives on Mixed Martial Arts.”6  The key protections discussed include: (1) Protecting 
fighter health7 (2) Restricting coercive contracts8 (3) Disclosing financial information9 (4) Creating 
objective rankings10 and (5) Prohibiting conflicts of interest.11  This note will discuss the necessity of 
the Muhammad Ali Expansion Act, as well as the need for unionization. Having said this, there are 
several hurdles fighters must overcome in order to gain such protections. 
 
On August 20, 2016, millions of MMA enthusiasts located around the globe tuned in to 
witness UFC 202: Diaz v. McGregor 2.12  The Ultimate Fighting Championship (“UFC”) took center 
stage and exhibited international prominence, highlighting one of the world’s fastest growing 
professional sports.  The fight of the night was a Welterweight (170 lb.) rematch between former UFC 
lightweight (155 lb.) title contender Nate Diaz and UFC featherweight (145 lb.) champion Conor 
McGregor.13 Conor McGregor won the rematch via majority decision (48–47, 47–47, 48–47).14  The 
rematch went on to set multiple records including the highest number of pay-per view buys, at 1.65 
                                                 
*J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2019; B.A. Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2011. 
Brandon currently serves as a research staff writer for the DePaul Sports Law Journal, and will serve as the Editor-in-
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1 Muhammad Ali Expansion Act, H.R. 44, 115th Cong. 
2 Id. at § 2(b)(8)(A).  
3 Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (2000); see also Professional Boxing Safety Act 15  
USC 6301.  
4 Supra note 1.  
5 Id. 
6 Transcript of November 9, 2017 hearing on Perspectives on Mixed Martial Arts, H.R. 44  
Before the Subcommittee on Digital Commerce on Consumer Protection, 115th Cong. (2017),  
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20171109/106604/HHRG-115-IF17-Transcript-20171109.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2018).   
7 Id. at 10.  
8 Id. at 34.  
9 Id. at 25-26.  
10Id. at 36.  
11Id. at 18.  
12En.wikipedia.org. (2018). UFC 202. [online] Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UFC_202 [Accessed 2 Apr. 
2018].  
13 Brent Brookhouse, Rematch between Nate Diaz and Conor McGregor set for UFC 202, MMA JUNKIE (Jun. 4, 2016), 
https://mmajunkie.com/2016/06/rematch-between-nate-diaz-and-conor-mcgregor-set-for- 
ufc-202 (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).  
14 Supra note 12.  
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million, and the highest purse ever recorded, which saw Conor McGregor take home $3 million.15  
The event attendance was 15,539 and the total gate revenue eclipsed $7.6 million.16  The UFC had 
cemented Mixed Martial Arts as a powerhouse professional sport poised for future success.  Having 
said this, the total payout for all 12 bouts was roughly 6 million dollars.17  Several of the fighters, even 
main card participants, walked away with less than $12,000 for their fights.18  Although McGregor was 
handsomely rewarded for his efforts, questions began to form as to the improper treatment of various 
other MMA fighters.  
 
A. Origins of Mixed Martial Arts  
 
In 648 B.C. the ancient Greeks added “Pankration” as a sport to the 33rd Olympic Games.19 
Pankration was a combat sport involving two participants who used boxing and wrestling techniques, 
such as a combination of strikes, chokes, and takedowns to submit their opponent.20  The fighting 
would continue until one of the competitors acknowledged defeat.21  Fighters fought in the nude and 
did not wear gloves.22  The goal of the sport was for one of the fighters to submit the other by any 
means necessary.23  Pankration had virtually no rules and the only outlawed activity was eye gouging 
and biting.24  The sport gained prominence for roughly a millennium until it was outlawed in the fourth 
century.25  Pankration remains the first recorded form of mixed martial arts.26 
 
B. Mixed Martial Arts Arrives in America  
 
In 1993, mixed martial arts became a professional sport in the United States when Rorion 
Gracie teamed up with Bob Meyrowitz and formed the Ultimate Fighting Championship.27  UFC-1 
was broadcast live via pay-per-view television on November 11, 1993.28  This event was held to test 
how various martial arts disciplines would fair when pitted against one another.  The fights took place 
in an eight-sided cage referred to as the “Octagon.”29  UFC-1 contestants did not wear gloves and 
                                                 
15 MMA Junkie Staff, Full UFC 202 salaries: McGregor, Diaz get $5 million of $6.1 million total payout,  
MMA JUNKIE (Aug. 22, 2016), https://mmajunkie.com/2016/08/full-ufc-202-salaries-mcgregor-diaz-get-5-million-of-
6-1-million-total-payout (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).  
16 MMA Junkie Staff, UFC 202 attendance: Entertaining card nets fifth highest gate in UFC history, MMA JUNKIE (Aug. 21, 
2016) https://mmajunkie.com/2016/08/ufc-202-attendance-entertaining-card-nets-fifth-highest-gate-in-ufc-history (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2018).  
17 MMA Junkie Staff, supra note 15.  
18 Id. 
19 Ancient History Encyclopedia, Pankration, Stella Nenova, https://www.ancient.eu/pankration/ (last visited  
May 1, 2018).  
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 Id.   
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Stefan Andrews, Pankration was the Ancient Olympics version of Mixed Martial Arts, and it is the only discipline not reinstated with 
the creation of Modern Olympics in 1896, THE VINTAGE NEWS (Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://www.thevintagenews.com/2017/01/19/pankration-was-the-ancient-olympics-version-of-mixed-martial-arts-
and-it-is-the-only-discipline-not-reinstated-with-the-creation-of-modern-olympics-in-1896/ (last visited May 1, 2018).  
27 Guillermo Cruz, Rorion Gracie and the day he created the UFC, MMA FIGHTING (Nov. 12, 2013), 
https://www.mmafighting.com/2013/11/12/5043630/rorion-gracie-and-the-day-he-created-the-ufc (last visited May 1, 
2018).  
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
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were allowed to do anything except for eye gouge or bite their opponent.30  Fighting relatively 
uncontested, Royce Gracie, the brother of co-founder Rorion Gracie, dominated the field at UFC-1.31  
The event garnered 85,000 viewers according to pay-per-view records.32  The UFC continued to grow 
in rapid fashion and as such began adapting time limits, weight classes, and safety restrictions. 
 
The UFC stated the three ways to defeat your opponent included submission, knockout, or 
death.33  The physical brutality of the sport coupled with its rapid growth caught the attention of 
political power players in Washington, D.C.  On numerous occasions, Senator John McCain (AZ) 
spoke before Congress to prohibit MMA fights from taking place across all 50 states.34  He referred 
to the nature of these bouts as “human cockfighting” and stressed the importance of prohibiting the 
advancement of the sport.35  As a result of Senator McCain’s efforts, a multitude of states enacted laws 
to regulate MMA contests and 36 states even banned MMA altogether.36  In 1997, McCain became 
chair of the Senate Commerce Committee and influenced several pay-per-view carriers to drop all 
MMA contests.37  The UFC’s growing revenue stream was sent into an immediate decline and the 
organization faced significant financial struggle for the next four years.38 
 
C. Expansion of UFC via Zuffa L.L.C. Acquisition  
 
After several years of financial turmoil, the near-bankrupt UFC received new life with its 2-
million-dollar acquisition by the Fertitta brothers and Dana White through their newly formed 
company, Zuffa L.L.C.39  The three men all shared the vision of turning MMA into a legitimate, 
mainstream sport.  The first course of action to legitimize the UFC was unified rules and safety 
regulations, which allowed MMA to be universally recognized as its own unique and authentic sport.   
 
On April 3, 2001, Marc Ratner of the Nevada State Athletic Commission and Larry Hazard 
of the New Jersey Athletic Commission met to discuss the sanctioning of mixed martial arts events.40  
The meeting addressed the lack of uniformity and the effect of constant rule changes on the safety of 
the sport.41  Both executives decided it was time to implement unified rules of competition regarding 
MMA events.42  On July 23, 2001 Nevada followed New Jersey in adopting the Unified Rules for Mixed 
Martial Arts (“Unified Rules”).43  The Unified Rules set weight classes, number of rounds, time limits, 
31 different fouls, and eight ways to properly end a fight.44  The Unified Rules led several states to lift 
                                                 
30 Peter Hess, The Development of Mixed Martial Arts: From Fighting Spectacles to State-Sanctioned Sporting Events, 4 Willamette 
Sports L.J. 1, 8 (2007).  
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Jordan T. Smith, Fighting for Regulation: Mixed Martial Arts Legislation in the United States, 58 Drake L. Rev. 617, 622 
(2010). 
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 Id.  
39 Clyde Gentry, No Holds Barred: Ultimate Fighting and the Martial Arts Revolution, 208, Milo Books (2d ed. 2005).  
40 Id. at 243.  
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 208.  
43 New Jersey State Athletic Control Board, Mixed Martial Arts Unified Rules of Conduct (purposed Apr. 2001) (to be 
codified at 13 N.J. Admin. Code, §§ 46-4.25) available at www.state.nj.us/lps/sacb/docs/martial.html (last Visited May 2, 
2018).  
44 Id.  
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their ban on MMA,  aiding the resurgence of MMA for purchase on pay-per-view.45  The institution 
of a unified rule system led to professional uniformity and increased fighter safety, both of which 
legitimized MMA.  The Unified Rules have become the standard rules, in most mixed martial arts 
productions.  These rules will be analyzed in further detail in the coming sections.  
 
D. Key Players 
 
There are several key players that comprise the entirety of a professional MMA bout.  The 
first category of players consists of the actual fighters.46  The fighters are defined as the participants in 
combat.47  The fighters are compensated directly from the MMA promotional organization and can 
receive purses ranging from a few thousand dollars to a few million.48  Additionally, they are often 
compensated through sponsorship deals, in an effort to brand a company’s product.49  The second 
category of key players are the fighters manager or agent.50  The manager/agent is responsible for 
handling all business and administrative needs of the fighter, such as procuring deals with promoters 
and sponsors.51  For this reason, managers must maintain relationships with both MMA promoters 
and sponsors in order to compensate fighters.52  Often fighters early in their careers rely on 
sponsorship money, as they do not receive enough from their fight purse alone.53 The manager/agent 
often receives a percentage of the fighter’s purse for his work.54  The third key player in MMA is the 
promotional organization.55  The promotional organization is the company that finances, promotes, 
and holds the MMA fights.56  Such companies include the UFC, Bellator, and StrikeForce.  The UFC 
is by far the largest promotional organization and was recently bought for over 4 billion dollars by 
talent agency WME-IMG.57  These promotional companies contract for the participants to compete 
on their fight card in exchange for a predetermined fight purse.58  The fourth and final players of note 
are the regulatory officials.59  Regulatory officials are associated with licensing, rule-making, oversight, 
and discipline.60  MMA regulation is a consistent endeavor and, as such, compliance serves as an 
integral part of the governance of large promotional organizations.61  For example, the UFC recently 
hired former Nevada State Athletic Commission Executive Marc Ratner to serve as its VP of 
                                                 
45 Id.  
46 Brendan S. Maher, Understanding and Regulating The Sport of Mixed Martial Arts, 32 Hastings Comm. & Ent L.J. 219-220 
(2009).  
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 Cf. Nev. Admin. Code § 467.0028 (2009) (defining “manager”). See also Mike Harris, End of an Era: Fighter-Manager 
Handshake Deals Die as MMA Grows, SHERDOG (Jan. 13, 2009), http://www.sherdog.com/news/articles/2/End-
of-an-Era-Fighter-Manager-Handshake-Deals-Die-as-MMA-Grows-15757 (last Visited Apr. 1, 2018).  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 Cf. Nev. Admin. Code § 467.0031 (2009) (defining “promoter”). 
56 Gary Wimsett, Promotions and the Use of Exclusive Fighter Agreements in MMA, FIVE OUNCES OF PAIN (May 19, 
2009), https://www.fiveouncesofpain.com/2009/05/19/promotions-and-the-use-of-exclusive-fighter-agreements-in-
mma/ (discussing promotional contracts) (last visited May 1, 2018).  
57 Joseph Cotterill and Cardiff Garcia, WME-IMG buys Ultimate Fighting Championship for $4bn, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jul. 
11, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/eed0fc18-4760-11e6-b387-64ab0a67014c (last visited May 2, 2018).  
58 Wimsett, supra note 56.  
59 Maher, supra note 46, at 220.   
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
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Regulatory Affairs.62  Ratner serves as the company’s officer in charge of state compliance, a position 
he once held and a field in which he maintains strong relationships.63  Evidently, conflicts of interest 
arise as powerful promotional organizations maintain influence over state regulators.  Owners of large 
promotional organizations often wield this power by threatening to hold bouts in other states, 
effectively precluding the state from collecting fees, taxes, and other revenues in relation to the MMA 
events.  Such monetary power leads many to believe that state regulators are beholden to the 
companies they are tasked with regulating.  
 
II. Current MMA Regulation  
 
In 2016, New York ended its ban on mixed martial arts, becoming the 50th and final state to 
legalize MMA.64  Currently, MMA is regulated by administrative bodies, state and federal statutes, or 
a combination of both.65  State legislatures have regulated MMA in the following two ways: (1) By 
granting administrative bodies the power to adopt and enforce regulations or (2) By passing 
regulations through statutory construction and then giving administrative bodies the power to enforce 
them.66  The first scenario allows the administrative agencies to actually draft MMA rules and 
regulations, while the second scenario only affords them the power to enforce existing statutory law.   
 
A. State Athletic Commissions  
 
The most common form of MMA regulation is for states to delegate authority to 
administrative bodies known as State Athletic Commissions.67  The state legislature then grants broad 
authority to the state athletic commission to oversee MMA related policy matters such as rulemaking.68  
Upon receiving this power, the Athletic Commission is afforded the right to elect the rules and 
regulations that will govern all aspects of the promotional bout procedure.69  The regulatory body will 
retain all discretion over these decisions.70  Upon the finality of their decisions, the rules become law 
pursuant to the states administrative codes.71  The benefit of this system is that, upon formation of an 
administrative body, administrative rules can be changed more quickly when compared to statutes, 
which require legislative action.72  In several states, the State Boxing Commission assumes the role of 
governance over regulating professional MMA events.73  A few states, including Alaska and Delaware, 
have no state athletic commission, deferring to the Association of Boxing Commissions.74   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Aaron Smith, MMA wins long fight to be legal in New York State, CNN MONEY (Mar. 23, 2016), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/23/news/mma-ufc-fight-in-new-york/index.html (last visited May 2, 2018).  
65 Smith, supra note 34, at 628.  
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 629.  
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
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B. Regulation via Statute  
 
The second approach to MMA regulation is when the legislature passes statutes regarding 
MMA and then directs an administrative body to adopt and enforce these statutory rules and 
regulations.75  States set standard health requirements, as well as tax and fee requirements, which the 
State Athletic Commission then enforces.76  This is more commonly seen in states which have recently 
lifted their bans on MMA.77  State legislators maintain more control in this scenario.78  
 
C. Unified Rules of Mixed Martial Arts  
 
As stated previously, the creation of the Unified Rules played an important role in the 
evolution of MMA regulation.  Drafted by the New Jersey Athletic Control Board, these rules of 
conduct unified regulations set forth by various mixed martial arts companies across the United 
States.79  The Unified Rules of Conduct created in-fight rules, equipment standards, and health and 
safety guidelines.80   
 
First, the Unified Rules established weight classes starting with flyweight (125 lbs.) and ending 
with super heavyweight (265+ lbs.).81  This decision outlawed weight discrepancies in MMA bouts, a 
dangerous aspect of early organizational events.82  Second, the Unified Rules established that the fight 
area had to be at least 18 feet by 18 feet and no bigger than 32 feet by 32 feet.83  This eliminated the 
disparity between differing fight organizations and made it easier for fighters to train properly for 
bouts.84  Third, the Unified Rules provided specific equipment requirements including: mouthpieces, 
protective cups, and commission sanctioned gloves.85  These equipment rules promoted fighter 
fairness while also increasing fighter safety.86  Fourth, the rules limited the number of rounds and 
round length.87  The rules limited the bouts to three rounds at 5 minutes per round.88  A rest period 
between each round was set at one minute.89   
 
Next, the Unified Rules provided a detailed system for scoring fights based on criteria 
guidelines involving striking, grappling, control, and aggressiveness.90  Athletes and fans now had a 
cognizable system capable of declaring a winner.  Given the complexity of MMA, as well as the 
subjectivity of judging, this amendment was far overdue.  Lastly, the Unified Rules established several 
key provisions to promote health and safety in MMA.  The Unified Rules banned several techniques 
                                                 
75 Id. at 630.  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Michael Kim, Mixed Martial Arts: The Evolution of A Combat Sport and Its Laws and Regulations, 17 Sports Law. J. 49, 56 
(2010).  
80 Id.  
81 N.J. Admin. Code §13:46-24A.1 (2003). 
82 Id.  
83 Id. §13:46-24A.2. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. §13:46-24A.4, -24A.9. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. §13:46-24A.11. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. §13:46-24A.13. 
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such as head butting, groin attacks, strikes to the spine, and various other techniques that had high 
risks of significant bodily injury to one’s opponent.91  MMA athletes were now required to take part 
in medical examinations and blood testing, while promoters were required to provide medical 
insurance, access to medical physicians, and other safety oversights.92 
 
D. Association of Boxing Commissions (ABC)  
 
The final regulatory body worth mentioning is the Association of Boxing Commissions 
(“ABC”).93  The ABC is a nonprofit organization created to serve as the national governing body over 
all combat sports.94  The ABC’s listed goals are to: (1) Promote uniform health and safety standards 
in boxing and MMA, (2) Provide accurate records for boxers and mixed martial artists, (3) Increase 
communication between organizations, (4) Publish medical and training information and education 
for all boxing and MMA related professionals, (5) Encourage adherence to, and enforcement of, 
applicable federal laws by each member of the ABC, and (6) Select and retain record keeping source 
for suspension and records.95  However, the ABC does not have any  binding authority over the state 
athletic commissions.96   
 
On January 1, 2017, after discussion by the ABC, changes were implemented to the Unified 
Rules of MMA.97  The new rules revise the language of the scoring criteria language and revising the 
definition of a “grounded fighter.”98  While the ABC does not have definitive power over the state 
commissions, it does have binding control over the terminology of the Unified Rules of MMA.99  
Whether or not state athletic commissions decide to implement these changes is up to them.  Since 
the implementation of these new rules, several states including—New Jersey, Ohio, Missouri, 
Colorado, Virginia, Maryland and South Dakota—have chosen not to adopt the changes in full.100  
Recent actions and inactions by individual states display the current mode of regulation in mixed 
martial arts.  Each state possesses its own legislature, which appoints its own commissioners who 
subsequently are given the power to act autonomously.101  
 
III. Current MMA Abuses  
 
Abuses in the modern age of MMA have mirrored a lot of the same abuses professional boxers 
faced several decades ago.  The abuses both athletes experienced can be broken down into three 
categories. Primary Examples include: (1) contractual abuses; (2) financial abuses; and (3) ranking 
abuses.  It is important to analyze these abuses as they have occurred in the formation of professional 
mixed martial arts. The necessity of the Expansion Act and its effect on MMA cannot be fully 
                                                 
91 Id. §13:46-24A.15. 
92 Id. §13:46-12A.3, -12A.16, -12A.17, -12B.2(d), -12B.6. 
93 Association of Boxing Commissions Const. & Bylaws (Jul. 31, 2006), http://www.abcboxing.com/abc- 
constitution/ (last visited May 2, 2018).  
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Marc Raimondi, New MMA rules to be implemented beginning Jan. 1, 2017, MMA FIGHTING (Aug. 3,  2016), 
https://www.mmafighting.com/2016/8/3/12370276/new-mma-rules-to-be-implemented-beginning- jan-1-2017 (last 
visited May 1, 2018).  
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id.  
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appreciated without an understanding of these abuses and their effect on MMA and its competitors.  
 
A. Contractual Abuses  
 
Although there are some regulations regarding bout agreements and fighter contracts, the 
content of the deals is determined heavily by individual athlete bargaining. For years, professional 
boxers faced significant bargaining disadvantages at the hands of the promoters, causing many to push 
for regulatory limits on the contractual relationship between competitors and professional boxing 
organizations.  The MMA field is currently facing similar issues. As a result of its success, the UFC 
has amassed a very large amount of bargaining power, unmatched by its member athletes.102  This 
means that MMA competitors have little recourse from coercive, one-sided contracts that heavily 
favor the interests of the fight organization.103  The UFC is notorious for its restrictive contracts, often 
giving its fighters an ultimatum regarding the terms and conditions of contracts and/or individual 
bout agreements.104 Given the fact that there are a multitude of fighter’s willing to accept these terms, 
fighters lack the necessary bargaining power to properly negotiate contract agreements.105  
Additionally, the UFC’s near monopoly on MMA contests make it even more difficult for competitors 
to gain access to a fair bargaining process.106  
 
Since gaining national prominence, the UFC has insisted that each of its competitors be held 
to exclusive fighter agreements.107  These agreements grant the promoter control over the contractual 
relationship ns a myriad of ways.  The term “exclusivity” asserts that fight organizations own the 
entirety of an athlete’s rights to participate in professional MMA fights.108 Competitors signed to 
exclusive contracts with the UFC must compete only in the UFC for the agreed upon term or the 
agreed upon number of fights.109  Regardless of the term provisions, the contract often involves 
termination rights and extension clauses, which can be exercised at the sole discretion of the fight 
organization.110 Essentially, the UFC can force fighters to compete exclusively for the UFC and not 
for any other fight organizations.111  This aspect of UFC policy has been litigated on numerous 
occasions.  Contract abuses seen in the UFC have mirrored several of the abuses that boxers of the 
previous generation faced.  The Ali Act defines a coercive contract as: 
 
 
                                                 
102 See generally Leland Roling, UFC Holds All the Power in Contract Negotiations with Dan Henderson, BLOODY ELBOW 
(Sep. 15, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2011/9/15/2426983/ufc-dan-henderson-holds-all-the-power-
in-contract-negotiations (last visited May 2, 2018).  
103 See Geoff Varney, Fighting for Respect: MMA's Struggle for Acceptance and How the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act Would 
Give It a Sporting Chance, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 269, 299-300 (2009) (discussing how the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform 
Act would prevent one-sided contracts if the Act applied to MMA). President Dana White has stated that fighters must 
“get with the program” and accept the terms of the contract or forget about fighting for the UFC.  
104 Matt De La Rosa, Historic MMA Rivalries, Part Four: UFC vs. Fighters, BLEACHER REPORT (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/128714-historic-mma-rivalries-part-4-ufc-vs-fighters (explaining  that the UFC is 
the biggest promoter in MMA and has the ““luxury” of running its business based  completely on its own preferences) 
(last visited May 2, 2018).  
105 Id.  
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Wimsett, supra note 56.  
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Gentry, supra note 39, at 52.  
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A contract provision that grants any rights between a boxer and promoter, or between 
promoters with respect to the boxer, if the boxer is required to grant such rights, or a 
boxer’s promoter is required to grant such rights with respect to a boxer to another 
promoter, as a condition precedent to the boxer’s participation in a professional 
boxing match against another boxer who is under contract to the promoter.112  
 
An example of this can be seen in the practices set forth by legendary boxing promoter Don King.113  
King often had boxers challenging for title fights sign an agreement stating that if they won a 
championship belt from a fight against one of his fighters they would be forced, upon winning the 
belt, to allow King to become their sole promoter.114  These provisions ensured that King would 
always be the promoter for the current boxing champion.115  This was an example of a fight promoter 
effectively contracting with his own interests in mind.116  This act is similar to that of the UFC’s 
“Champions Clause” and is what the Ali Act sought to address.117  
 
A controversial extension clause, often used in UFC contracts, is the “Champions Clause.”118  
This clause asserts that promoters can precondition the extension of a contract, if a fighter wins a belt 
while under the original contract terms.119  This has an enormous effect on the bargaining power of 
the champion, as he cannot use his title as a bargaining chip to retain more money from the current 
organization or a different organization with a better offer. This prevents the best fighters from leaving 
and joining other fight organizations.120  A hotly debated issue involving this clause is whether the 
UFC should have time restrictions.121  In theory, the UFC could draft a contract with a Champions 
Clause that extends indefinitely, thus maintaining exclusive rights to a fighter for as long as he is the 
UFC champion.122 A clause like this must be restricted to allow for fighters’ to properly utilize their 
status as the world’s best. An example of this contractual abuse can be seen in the UFC’s handling of 
Anderson Silva.  Early in his career, Silva wanted to fight boxing champion Roy Jones Jr. in a boxing 
match.123  In order to fight in a separate organization, Silva would have had to first breach his UFC 
contract, at which point he would be subject to damages at the hands of the UFC.124 
 
The next provision that unfairly disadvantages fighters is the “Retirement Clause”, which is 
invoked when a top fighter retires.125  It allows the fight organization to retain the rights of the retired 
fighter in perpetuity.126  This clause gives the UFC the power to suspend the contract term for the 
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period in which the fighter is not competing.127  Not only does this clause not allow fighters to retire 
and then work for another organization, it also guarantees the fighter will still be subject to all the 
contractual provisions controlling the athlete’s behavior.128 For example, UFC legend Randy Couture 
was sued by the UFC for breach of contract for attempting to compete for another organization. In 
addition, the UFC sought damages related to comments Couture made about the UFC after retiring.129  
As you can see, certain provisions can become quite restrictive on athletes, even beyond retirement 
from the sport.  
 
Lastly, fight organizations often make their participants sign an Ancillary Rights Agreement, 
which requires the fighter to sign over his or her name and likeness over to the fight organization.130 
Pursuant to the agreement, fighters assign the UFC exclusive rights to be used in any way the 
organization sees fit.131  This agreement becomes prevalent when you have new fighters who start in 
the UFC, but do not rise to fame in the UFC.  If a fighter loses and is terminated by the UFC, but 
later gains fame in another organization, the UFC still retains the rights to his or her likeness.132  
Therefore, the agreement allows the UFC to prevent an athlete from taking part in self-promotion 
even after his career with the UFC is finished.133  Again, the UFC preys on the minimal bargaining 
power afforded to new fighters looking to get their start. If fighters choose not to accept these terms, 
their spot will be given to another fighter who will.134  
 
The UFC often uses certain broad termination agreements to get rid of fighters.135  Examples 
of such termination reasons include losses, failed drug tests, and unapproved sponsorships.136  Matt 
Lindland was a top contender in the middleweight division who was dismissed from the UFC after 
wearing an unapproved sponsor’s logo on his T-Shirt during a pre-fight weigh-in.137  The UFC claimed 
Lindland’s act was a material breach of the contract’s conflict of interest provisions.138  A seemingly 
harmless act led to Lindland’s suspension from the UFC and was believed to be the reason the UFC 
chose not to renegotiate his next contract.139 This small act displays the contractual power fight 
organizations possess and their willingness to exercise this power at a fighter’s expense. In all, these 
provisions have an adverse effect on fighters and their careers. The fight organizations maintain an 
increasingly high level of bargaining power, and as such, use this power to draft restrictive contracts 
that can be extended or terminated solely at the discretion of the fight organization. 
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B. Financial Abuses  
 
Major mixed martial arts organizations such as the UFC and Bellator remain steadfast in their 
decision not to reveal the financial disclosures of their events and business.140  This means that fighters 
remain in the dark on just how much money their fights actually do in terms of revenue for their fight 
organization.141  The highest fight purse recorded in UFC history was given to Conor McGregor for 
his fight against Nate Diaz at UFC 202.142  McGregor collected $3 million for his participation in the 
fight, while Diaz collected $2 million.143  Although a combined $5 million may sound generous, the 
key to a proper analysis of this statistic requires knowledge of how much the  UFC brought in as a 
result of the fight.  If the UFC made $100 million, then perhaps $5 million is no longer commensurate 
with the event.  To put this into perspective, Conor McGregor collected at least $30 million for his 
most recent fight against Floyd Mayweather.144  This event took place, not for the UFC, but for 
professional boxing.  The deal was believed to have included additional television rights and 
endorsements, which would have put McGregor’s estimated combined earnings for the event at $100-
150 million.145  The McGregor boxing match did 4.3 million pay-per-view buys, while the UFC event 
did 1.65 million buys, roughly 2.5 times as many buys.146  Having said this, the payout of the boxing 
match was 10 times the payout of the UFC fight as opposed to 2.5, which remains incommensurate 
with the above difference in pay-per-view buys. Currently, 259 of the UFC’s 537 competitors make 
less than $57,000 per year, which is the U.S. household median income.147 73 UFC fighters actually 
collected less than $15,000 in 2017, which falls under the annual minimum wage in the United States.148  
Only 29 UFC fighters made over $450,000 in 2017, which is currently the NFL’s league minimum 
salary.149  UFC champion T.J. Dillashaw made  $280,000 in all of 2017, despite defeating Cody 
Garbrandt to become the bantamweight world champion.150  Despite these lopsided statistics, the 
UFC remains steadfast in its unwillingness to disclose the revenues of their events. This unwillingness 
to disclose the financials of professional MMA events naturally begs the question, “Are professional 
MMA fighters being taken advantage of financially?”  
 
C. Ranking Abuses  
 
The third abuse related to the current system of UFC governance can be seen in the current 
ranking system.151  The UFC has come under heavy scrutiny by its former competitors and 
Congressman Markwayne Mullin, because the current system lacks an independent sanctioning 
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organization.152  Rankings are determined by a select group of journalists, who are employed by the 
UFC.153  This has led many to believe that the UFC maintains total control over the ranking system. 
If this is the case, fights may not be given to fighters who have earned them, by way of being the 
number one challenger, but given to fighters who can best aid the promoters purpose, which is almost 
always based on which fighters can bring in the most revenue.  For example, at UFC 193, Holy Holm 
was given a title shot against Ronda Rousey, despite Holm being ranked 8th at the weight class.  It was 
speculated that the UFC determined the Holm v. Rousey matchup to be the most appealing to fans 
and most profitable for the organization.154  At the time Holm fought Rousey, there were 6 fighters 
ranked ahead of her who should have reasonably been given a shot at fighting Rousey before Holm.  
Another example, was at UFC 217, where George St. Pierre was given the opportunity to fight world 
champion Michael Bisping, although St. Pierre hadn’t fought competitively in several years.155  An 
independent ranking system would have never allowed a semi-retired fighter to immediately participate 
in a title fight upon his return to the sport.  However, the UFC controlled system determined this 
matchup to be profitable enough to allow it to move forward as an “extenuating circumstance.”  As 
you can see, this system is in dire need of an overhaul in order to fix the inconsistencies that currently 
dominate the system. The current lack of an independent ranking system raises valid concerns 
regarding the legitimacy of the sport. If fighters are not able to earn a title shot based on merit, the 
sport and its fans will surely suffer the consequences.  
 
IV. Statutory Construction  
 
Professional MMA organizations face pressure from the Congressional Subcommittee on 
Digital Commerce and Consumer Protections to fix the current abuses plaguing professional 
fighters.156  As a result of this pressure, the United States House of Representatives have proposed 
H.R. 44 – Muhammad Ali Expansion Act, to expand the rights of professional MMA fighters.157  In 
order to fully understand the intricacies of this bill, relevant legislation preceding this bill must first be 
analyzed.  The Expansion Act is proposed as legislation amending the Professional Boxing Safety Act 
of 1996 and the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act.158  These two bills were enacted to combat the 
abuses seen in the professional boxing industry.159  They serve as precedent for the Expansion Act.160 
 
A. Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996  
 
H.R. 4167, dubbed the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, was created as the initial policy 
measure against the abuses facing professional boxers.161  The act has several key provisions related to 
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requirements for state athletic commissions and imposes penalties for illegal activities. The act first 
prohibits any person from arranging, promoting, organizing, producing, or fighting in a professional 
boxing match held in a State that has no boxing commission unless the match is: (1) supervised by a 
commission from another State; and (2) subject to the most recent Association of Boxing 
Commissions guidelines, as well as any additional relevant professional regulations and requirements 
of such other State. The act also requires that for any professional boxing match: (1) a physical 
examination of each boxer to determine fitness to compete; (2) the presence of an ambulance or 
medical personnel and a physician on site; and (3) health insurance coverage for each boxer.162  
This section of the act gives great power to the state athletic commissions, but also places stringent 
rules on their actions. The act begins by placing significant emphasis on fighter safety. Section 6 of 
the act requires that every professional boxer register with the commission in the state in which that 
boxer presides.163  The commission is then directed to issue an identification card to each registrant.164 
 
Next, Section 7 directs each commission to establish procedures to: (1) evaluate the 
professional records and physician's certification of each boxer participating in a match in the State 
and to deny fight authorization where appropriate; (2) ensure that no boxer is permitted to box while 
under suspension from any commission due to a recent knockout or series of consecutive losses, an 
injury, a required medical procedure, a physician denial of certification, failure of a drug test, or use of 
false aliases, identification cards, or documents; (3) review a suspension when appealed by a boxer; 
and (4) revoke a suspension where appropriate proof is presented that a suspension was not, or is no 
longer, merited by the facts.165  Now the act goes beyond health and safety concerns and focuses on 
the denial of fight authorizations.  
 
Section 9 outlines the key requirements for conflict-of-interests in regard to commission 
members or employees, persons who administer or enforce State boxing laws, and members of the 
ABC.166  This section was important in combating the abuses facing the boxing industry in the 1990’s.  
 
B. Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act  
 
H.R. 1832, Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, was enacted in 2000 to amend the 
Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996.167  The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act directs the 
Association of Boxing Commissions  to develop and approve, by a majority vote of its member State 
boxing commissioner’s, guidelines for: (1) minimum contractual provisions that should be included in 
bout agreements and boxing contracts; and (2) objective and consistent written criteria for the ratings 
of professional boxers.168  The act declares that a contract provision shall be considered to be in 
restraint of trade, contrary to public policy, and unenforceable, against any boxer to the extent that it 
contains a coercive provision as provided in this Act and that: (1) it is for a period greater than a year; 
or (2) the other boxer under contract to the promoter came under that contract pursuant to a coercive 
provision.169  The act continues by stating that it “prohibits a boxing service provider from requiring 
a boxer to grant any future promotional rights as a requirement of competing in a professional boxing 
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match that is a mandatory bout under the rules of the sanctioning organization.”170  These provisions 
are pertinent to the UFC and the current mishandling of their competitors.  
 
This act began to address some of the key abuses seen in the professional boxing industry. It 
amended the previous act by adding clauses that prohibit a sanctioning organization from receiving 
any compensation, directly or indirectly, in connection with a match unless, not later than January 31 
of each year, it submits to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and to the ABC: (1) a complete 
description of the organization's ratings criteria, policies, and general sanctioning fee schedule; (2) the 
bylaws of the organization; (3) the appeals procedure of the organization for a boxer's rating; and (4) 
a list and business address of the organization's officials who vote on the ratings of boxers.171  This 
clause was directly added as a safeguard against non-independent ranking systems.  
 
The act set forth provisions regarding required disclosures.  The Act requires MMA 
organizations to disclose: (1) to State boxing commissions by sanctioning organizations; (2) for 
promoters; and (3) for judges and referees.172  Required financial disclosures are the key aspect of this 
provision, as professional boxers had been financially taken advantage of for years.  This amendment 
sought to end financial abuses of this manner.  Similar abuses are thought to be taking place in MMA. 
Additionally, the act set forth additional provisions to combat contractual abuses related to the 
emerging conflicts of interest.173  The act stated that “it amends the Boxing Act to prohibit: (1) a 
promoter from having a direct or indirect financial interest in the management of a boxer; or (2) a 
manager from having a direct or indirect financial interest in the promotion of a boxer, or from being 
employed by or receiving compensation or other benefits from a promoter, except for amounts 
received as consideration under the manager's contract with the boxer.”174  As you can see, the 
Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act intended to combat several abuses in boxing industry, that directly 
mirror abuses now facing MMA.  
 
C. Muhammad Ali Expansion Act  
 
H.R. 44, or the Muhammad Ali Expansion Act, is a current bill that was introduced in 2017 
and is awaiting committee determination prior to a United States House of Representatives vote.175  
The Expansion Act’s purpose is the inclusion of MMA fighters as competitor’s subject to the 
Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996.176  The expansion of MMA fighters as categorical members 
of the Professional Boxing Safety Act would undoubtedly combat the current abuses competitors face 
in the MMA industry.  As such, the Expansion Act amends the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 
1996 to: (1) establish definitions for "fighter," "combat sport competition," and "mixed martial arts"; 
and (2) include individuals who fight in a professional mixed martial arts competition or other 
professional combat sport competition, such competitions, and the professional combat sports 
industry within the scope of such Act.177 
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The Expansion Act’s main purpose is two-fold. The Expansion Act requires the Association 
of Boxing Commissions, within two years after its enactment, to establish: (1) guidelines for minimum 
contractual provisions that should be included in bout agreements and mixed martial arts and other 
combat sport contracts, and (2) guidelines for objective and consistent written criteria for the ratings 
of mixed martial arts and other combat sports.178  The Expansion Act places emphasis on these two 
provisions, since congress believes the contractual and ranking abuses are central to fighter 
mismanagement in professional mixed martial arts.179  The specifics of the Expansion Act are devised 
to directly combat the individual abuses present in MMA.  Additionally, the Expansion Act applies 
conflict of interest provisions that prohibit a promoter from having a financial interest in the 
management of a boxer, or a manager from having a financial interest in the promotion of a boxer, to 
fighters participating in a mixed martial arts or other combat sport competition scheduled for 11 
minutes or more.180  In furtherance of this standard, if the Expansion Act is passed, financial 
disclosures will become commonplace. This has to happen for fighters to gain adequate compensation.  
In all, the Expansion Act is of vital importance to the well-being of current MMA fighters and the 
growth of professional fight organizations.  
 
V. Effect of the Muhammad Ali Expansion Act on the aforementioned MMA Abuses  
 
The Muhammad Ali Expansion Act seeks to redefine those subject to the Professional Boxing 
Safety Act to include MMA fighters. If the Expansion Act becomes law, it will have a similar effect 
on MMA, as the Professional Boxing Safety Act had on professional boxing in the 1990’s. The 
Expansion Act’s central purpose is to combat all aspects of contractual, financial, and ranking abuses 
that are present in MMA.  
 
A. The Muhammad Ali Expansion Act’s Effect on Contractual Abuses  
 
By allowing MMA fighters to be subject to the Expansion Act, the fighters will attain 
immediate benefits related to their contractual relationship with their respective fight organization. 
The Expansion Act would require that not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of its 
enactment, the Association of Boxing Commissions shall develop and shall approve guidelines for 
minimum contractual provisions, to be included in bout agreements and other MMA contracts.181  
 
Before we analyze the effect of this provision, it is important to first gain an understanding of 
what exactly Congress deems to be a coercive contract. Congress states that a coercive contract is “a 
contract provision that grants any rights between a boxer and promoter if the boxer is required to 
grant such rights, as condition precedent to the boxer’s participation in a professional boxing match 
against a boxer who is under contract to the promoter, for a period greater than 12 months.”182  The 
key analysis here is two-fold. First, a contract would be coercive if it is greater than 12 months.183  
Second, competitors could not be forced to give up their rights as a condition for participation.184  
Subject to the proposed Expansion Act, if  a promoter were to own the rights to a champion and a 
second fighter wanted to fight the champion, the champions promoter could acquire the rights to the 
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second fighter if he won. However, the promoter would only be able to acquire the second fighter’s 
right for up to one year.185  This provision directly combats the “Champions Clause” by not allowing 
for a fight organization to use its power to retain the rights to a challenger, shall he become the 
champion, for more than one year.186  Upon one year of competing, the challenger is free to compete 
for whichever fight organization he or she chooses.187  This gives MMA champions the right to use 
their status as a world champion to procure employment at their own discretion, which would allow 
the fighters to capitalize on significant financial opportunities.188  Additionally, the Expansion Act’s  
yearlong provision would combat both the “exclusivity” restrictions and the “retirement clause” 
currently in play within fight organizations.189  Also, this provision prohibits promoters from forcing 
fighters to sign long term option contracts in order to get initial fights.190  The standards established 
pursuant to the Expansion Act will address the term length of the contracts and the responsibilities 
of the parties to remedy the above mentioned abuses.191  The ABC will be tasked with establishing a 
set of guidelines to eradicate unfair terms as set by the current industry players.192  
 
Another important aspect of limiting contractual abuses is the right to attain a mandatory 
challenger status.193  If an MMA fighter is able to attain mandatory challenger status, he or she will not 
be subject to any coercion at the hands of the fight organization, because the organization will have 
no leverage to impose on the fighter.  If a fighter attains mandatory challenger status, the fighter will 
not have to give up any future promotional rights.  This regulatory standard is the type of action the 
Expansion Act can procure for the benefit of MMA fighters across the nation.  Under this provision, 
the mandatory challenger must be given a title shot, even if he refuses to sign a long term deal with 
the fight organization. 
 
The provisions established by the Expansion Act will address not only the duration of the 
contract, but also the obligations of both parties, as well any other terms the ABC deems necessary. 
Provisions include a limitation on the rights of fight organizations to ascertain the likeness and life 
rights of its’ competitors.  These exact determinations are not known at this time, but what is known 
is the necessity for continuing safety efforts.  
 
B. Ali Expansion Act Effect on Financial Abuses  
 
Under the proposed Expansion Act, a promoter would not be entitled to receive any 
compensation directly or indirectly in connection with a match until it provided to the competitor it 
promotes—(1) the amount of any compensation or consideration that a promoter has contracted to 
receive from such match; (2) all fees, charges, and expenses that will be assessed by or through 
the promoter on the boxer pertaining to the event, including any portion of the fighter’s purse that 
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the promoter will receive, and training expenses; and (3) any reduction in a fighter’s purse contrary to 
a previous agreement between the promoter and the fighter or a purse bid held for the event.194  
 
The first clause requiring the promoter to disclose the amount of any compensation that a 
promoter has contracted to receive from such match, is vital towards aiding MMA fighters.  Currently, 
fighters do not have the luxury of knowing exactly how much money they generate for their respective 
fight organizations and, as a result, promoters can exploit the fighters’ skills and make significantly 
more money than the fighters.195  This total revenue disclosure would undoubtedly give the MMA 
fighter a much needed bargaining chip to negotiate fair compensation.  Although arguments have been 
made regarding how the fight revenue is used, revenue disclosures still prevail as a necessary force to 
benefit a historically disadvantaged party.  
 
The second clause addresses the disclosure of all fees, charges, and expenses that will be 
assessed by or through the promoter on the fighter pertaining to the event.196  This will prevent a 
promoter from reducing the boxer’s compensation, through the creation of a formalized record as to 
the necessary expenses.197  This clause will force promoters to display transparency in fight 
negotiations and dealings, which will deter promoters from altering obligations to their competitors 
prior to the fight.  Additionally, by documenting these obligations, dispute resolution would become 
manageable.   
 
The third clause, referencing any reduction in a boxer’s purse contrary to a previous agreement 
between the promoter and the fighter, shall serve the purpose of holding promoters accountable to 
their original agreements.  The ability to reduce fighter purses in direct conflict with an agreed-upon 
figure, is detrimental to the financial stability of the organizations fighters.  The organization is 
allowing itself a windfall, at the hands of its fighters. This act of deceit is the exact kind of maneuver 
the Ali Expansion Act hopes to eliminate. 
 
Furthermore, the Expansion Act would set mandatory disclosures to the state boxing 
commissions as well.198   Promoters shall not be entitled to receive any compensation directly or 
indirectly in connection with a match until it provides to the athletic commission responsible for 
regulating the match, a statement of— (1) a copy of any agreement in writing to which the promoter is 
a party with any fighter participating in the match; (2) a statement made under penalty of perjury that 
there are no other agreements, written or oral, between the promoter and the fighter with respect to 
that match; and (3) (A) all fees, charges, and expenses that will be assessed by or through 
the promoter on the fighter pertaining to the event, including any portion of the fighter’s purse that 
the promoter will receive, and training expenses; (B)  all payments, gifts, or benefits the promoter is 
providing to any sanctioning organization affiliated with the event; and (C) any reduction in a fighter’s  
purse contrary to a previous agreement between the promoter and the fighter or a purse bid held for 
the event.199  These provisions ensure that the state athletic commission also receives disclosures 
necessary to promoting a fair contest.200  The key provision here is provision (2) which states there are 
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no other agreements between the competitor and the promoter.201  This ensures that only one 
agreement exists, and that the promoter does not force a fighter to sign more than one contract with 
varying terms.  The other clauses have a similar effect as mentioned above.  
 
The last aspect of the Expansion Act requires that certain disclosures be made to state attorney 
generals.202  A promoter would have to make information required to be disclosed under this section 
available to the chief law enforcement officer of the State in which the match is to be held upon 
request of such officer.203 This would enable law enforcement officials to investigate promotional 
deals. This would add protection for fighters unable to challenge promoters who maintain immense 
bargaining power.  Also, this may deter a promoter from engaging in inequitable business practices.  
 
C. Ali Expansion Act Effect on Ranking Abuses  
 
The proposed Ali Expansion Act states that “within 2 years after its enactment, the ABC shall 
develop and shall approve guidelines for objective and consistent written criteria for the ratings of 
professional fighters.”204  It is the hope of Congress that sanctioning organizations follow these 
guidelines.205  This immediately calls into question the current UFC system, which allows UFC 
journalists to control the entirety of the ranking process.  Objective and consistent written criteria 
administered by the ABC would lead to an independently controlled ranking system.206  This system 
will not be as susceptible to promoter interests, as it would not formally be associated with the 
promotional company.  An independent ranking system will help fighters receive title fights on the 
basis of his or her merit, regardless of the fights potential revenue.  
 
The Expansion Act continues by explaining the appeals process, which would require the 
sanctioning organization to provide the fighter with a written explanation of the organization’s criteria, 
its rating of the fighter, and the rationale or basis for its rating.207  This would give fighters the 
opportunity to appeal their ranking, a luxury not afforded to current fighters competing in the UFC.208  
If a fighter were to appeal, the sanctioning organization would then be required to issue him or her an 
explanation.209  This clause would put an exceeding amount of pressure on the UFC and its current 
ranking system.  
 
Furthermore, the Expansion Act would prohibit a sanctioning organizations from receiving 
any compensation, until, with respect to a change in rating, the organization—(1) posts a copy, within 
7 days of such change, on its Internet website or home page, if any, including an explanation of such 
change, for a period of not less than 30 days; and (2) provides a copy of the rating change and 
explanation to an association to which at least a majority of the State boxing commissions belong.210  
This clause hopes to guarantee that a ranking system is not arbitrary, but warrants merit. 
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Additionally, the Expansion Act would require the sanctioning organization provide the 
Federal Trade Commission with a complete description of their ratings, criteria, policies, and general 
sanctioning fee lists, the organizer’s bylaws, and appeal procedures.211  This would provide for 
increased consistency in a ranking system that has lacked such stability in the past.  
 
The Expansion Act is a necessity in the sport of Mixed Martial Arts. Its enactment will help 
remedy the sports past abuses, while simultaneously attracting top talent. In all, the Expansion Act 
must be passed for the betterment of the athletes, but also to legitimize the sport and guide it towards 
further international success.  
 
VI. Unionization  
 
In the business world, the scariest phrase to a business owner is “unionization.”  In the case 
of the UFC, I believe unionization would actually serve as a benchmark displaying the company’s 
worldwide presence.  In sports, the talk of unionization is often a sign that the organization is 
financially flourishing while starting to gain global recognition.  Here, unionization is necessary to 
propel the UFC from being a second-tier sports organization to a first-tier business entity captivating 
audiences on an international stage.  Unionization is a staple of modern American sports.  The time 
has come for the UFC to start allowing athletes to collectively bargain regarding their terms and 
conditions of employment.  This process, along with the Expansion Act, will allow fighters the same 
opportunities given to athletes in other major American sporting leagues such as the NFL, MLB, and 
NBA.  Unionization in these sports drastically increased athlete rights.  Having said this, UFC fighters 
face a major obstacle rarely seen in the American sports landscape.  UFC fighters are currently 
classified as independent contractors and not employees, meaning they do not have Section 7 rights 
to collectively bargain under the National Labor Relations Act.212  This prohibits the formation of a 
union.213 
 
A. Independent Contractors or Employees?  
 
UFC fighters are currently hired as independent contractors or subcontractors, which is a very 
important distinction because it bars fighters from receiving employee benefits, worker’s 
compensation, and the right to unionize.214  Although UFC fighters are hired as independent 
contractors, many believe they have grown to be employees over the last few years.  To determine 
whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor, one must look to the factors set 
out in Donovan v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc.215  This case established the Sureway Cleaners Test, which 
is a six-factor test analyzing control, investment, profit/loss, skill, permanency, and integral part.216  
The test weighs each of the factors in their totality to determine whether an individual is an employee 
or independent contractor.217 
 
                                                 
211 Id. 
212 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169  
213 Id.  
214 Id.  
215 Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985).  
216 Id. at 1382.  
217 Id.  
126 DePaul J. of Sports Law, Volume 14, Issue 1 
 
 
 
First, we must address the control factor.218  This factor is the most important factor in 
determining whether an individual is an independent contractor or an employee.219  The control factor 
analyzes the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the manner in which the work is to be 
performed.220  Examples of control include the employer’s right to determine when one shows up, 
how work is to be done, the amount of supervision given to individuals, discipline, hiring, firing, 
setting hours, setting wages, and assigning work.221  The current UFC format forces competitors to 
wear a UFC sanctioned uniform and participate in anti-doping programs.222  The UFC controls 
assignment of work by determining which fighters get to fight one another.223 The UFC also controls 
the fight schedules, which means it controls when fighters must show up.224 The UFC’s strict rules of 
competition displays its control over how the competitors work is to be done.225  Additionally, the 
UFC controls the hiring and firing of its athletes, as well as the disciplining of fighters.226  The UFC’s 
counter argument may be that it does not control the wages of the athletes, rather a fighter’s wages 
are negotiated by the UFC and the athlete’s manager or agent.227  Although this is true, oftentimes the 
UFC has so much bargaining power that the athlete is forced to accept whatever the UFC has to offer 
in terms of wages.  Looking at the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that the fighters should be 
classified as employees based on the control factor of the Sureway Cleaners Test, but we must 
remember that the test analyzes its factors through a totality of the circumstances approach.  
 
The second factor is profit or loss.228  This factor analyzes the alleged employee’s opportunity 
for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill.229  The profit or loss factor weighs in favor of 
having fighters be classified as independent contractors.  If we substitute managerial skill for training, 
then the fighter has significant opportunity to control his or her own profit or loss.  Based on their 
training and work methods, UFC fighters control this aspect of the test.  
 
The third factor is the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for 
his task, or his employment of helpers.230  This factor is more complex because fighters have to invest 
in their own equipment and materials related to their training, while the UFC has to invest in the 
equipment and materials related to the actual fight.231  For example, fighters invest in sparring 
equipment, partners, and training gyms, while the UFC invests in stadiums, training facilities, UFC 
sponsored gear, TV equipment, and much more.232  As a result, this factor could allow fighters to be 
classified as independent contractors or employees. In the case of UFC fighters, the UFC’s investment 
in the fight outweighs the fighter’s investment. Again, signaling that fighters are employees.  
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The fourth factor, in determining the status of an alleged employee, is whether the service 
rendered requires a special skill.233  The more special a skill is, the more likely a court is to find that 
individual is an independent contractor.234  Given the specialty of mixed martial arts fighters, this 
factor would signal an independent contractor relationship.  
 
The fifth factor is degree of permanence of the working relationship.235  This factor analyzes 
the permanency of the working relationship.236  It states that employees are often hired for indefinite 
amounts of time, while independent contractors are hired for projects and are not expected to work 
forever.237  In this case,  a court should rule that UFC fighters are independent contractors because 
they work on a fight to fight to basis, which is similar to that of a project basis.238  The court will most 
likely determine fights are equivalent to projects.  
 
The sixth and final factor is whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged 
employer’s business.239  This factor, along with the control factor, holds the most weight in the 
analysis.240  The integral part factor determines whether the fighter’s job duties is essential to the alleged 
employer’s business.241  Seeing as though fighters serve as the essential aspect to the employer’s 
operation, it can reasonably be concluded that fighters are employees.242  Without the fighter’s services 
the business would undoubtedly collapse.243  
 
The six-factor analysis of Sureway Cleaners has found that three factors are in favor of 
employee and three factors are in favor of independent contractor.  Although the factors remain split, 
the totality of the circumstances overwhelmingly support the notion that fighters are employees. 
Seeing as though the control and integral part factors hold the most weight, it is reasonable to assume 
that fighters are employees operating at the behest of their employer, the UFC. This conclusion would 
allow fighters the right to collectively bargain by attaining Section 7 Rights under the NLRA.  This 
right would be accompanied by employee benefits, worker’s compensation, and the right to unionize.  
All of which, would aid fighters in obtaining equity as professional athletes.  This right must be granted 
to fighters as the final step in ushering in a new era governing Mixed Martial Arts.  
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
For decades mixed martial arts competitors have suffered at the hands of unjust promotional 
organizations wielding unscrupulous amounts of power.  The emergence of the Muhammad Ali 
Expansion Act, as well as the need for unionization are natural and logical steps that need to be taken 
to further advance the rights of MMA fighters.  Congressman Markwayne Mullin has begun the 
conversation about the current abuses seen in the MMA industry, but he has gone a step further by 
proposing swift and immediate action to combat such abuses.  
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In my opinion, fight organizations such as the UFC should be welcoming of this legislation, 
as it signals the dominance of their organization within the American sports landscape.  MMA has 
become so much more than a low budget, fight-to-the-death event; it has become an international 
spectacle with viewers all around the globe.  It is time the UFC provides fighters with benefits equal 
to those seen in various other professional sports.  When professional fighters start receiving equitable 
benefits, there is no telling how prosperous the world of MMA can become.  I look forward to the 
upcoming congressional matters and the effect they may have on the growth of this great sport.  
